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Abstract:  
 
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there 
are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment 
(punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas.  
Varying treatments of a voluntary contributions experiment, we find that availability of higher-
order punishment opportunities increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full 
information on the pattern of punishing and its history, when any subject can punish any other, 
and when the numbers of punishment and of contribution stages are not too unequal.   
 
Keywords: collective action, social dilemma, voluntary contribution, public goods, punishment, 
counter-punishment, higher-order punishment. 
 
JEL classification codes: C9, H41, D0 
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Research Highlight: 
 We conduct voluntary contribution experiments with opportunities to punish.  
 Most treatments also permit higher-order punishment. 
 In most cases, higher-order punishing opportunities do not harm cooperation. 
 When subjects know only who punished them this period, designated opportunities to 
counter-punish are harmful to cooperation and efficiency. 
 Symmetric higher-order punishing opportunities with fuller information and history 
display aids cooperation significantly. 
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1. Introduction 
In research on cooperation in social dilemmas, the role of punishment has received 
considerable attention.  Many subjects in experiments are seen to engage in costly punishment 
even in the absence of strategic motives for doing so (Fehr and Gӓchter, 2002; Falk et al., 2005). 
In subject pools drawn from societies with well-functioning institutions, most punishment is 
directed at non-cooperators, and the availability of punishment leads to greater cooperation 
levels (Herrmann et al., 2008).  An important unsettled question, however, is when (if ever) do 
the benefits of punishment opportunities survive the possibility of counter-punishment, feuds and 
vendettas. If these problems are serious and common, they could explain why modern societies 
favor the use of formal enforcement mechanisms and attempt to suppress peer-to-peer 
punishment (Markussen et al. 2014; Kamei et al., 2015).  We contribute to the discussion by 
reporting a set of experiments that make available the information and opportunities with which 
to engage in higher-order punishment, including counter-punishment.   
Views on the role of higher-order punishment cover a wide range, beginning with 
suggestions in the evolutionary literature that a preference for punishing non-cooperators (that is, 
for engaging in first-order punishment) could have been selected for thanks to second-order 
punishment of those who failed to (first-order) punish (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 
2004).
1
 On the other end of the spectrum are some papers by experimental economists which 
suggest that higher-order punishments are problematic since they often take the form of 
retaliation and lead to feuds or vendettas.  The concern about retaliation and vendettas was raised 
as early as John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (2005 [1689]) and used as one basis of 
his argument that sanctioning should be the province of government rather than of individual 
citizens.  The potential of counter-punishment to deter and thus to undermine the efficacy of 
punishment, while adding to its cost, has been demonstrated in laboratory experiments by 
Denant-Boemont et al. (2007),  Nikiforakis (2008), Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009), and Engel et 
                                                          
1
 Axelrod (1986) relatedly discusses “a norm that one must punish those who do not punish a defection,” labeling it 
a “meta-norm.”     
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al. (2011).
2
  Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011), Nicklisch and Wolff (2011), Nikiforakis, 
Noussair and Wilkening (2012), Engelmann and Nikiforakis (forthcoming) and Bolle, Tan and 
Zizzo (2010) further investigate how feuds can be resource-destroying and how the danger of 
feuds can reduce the frequency or increase the severity of first-order punishment when retaliation 
is permitted to go on for many rounds.  
In addition to the possibilities that higher-order punishment opportunities will be used to 
punish those who fail to do their part in punishing norm-violators or that it will be used to 
retaliate against the punisher, pro-social actors might use higher-order punishment opportunities 
to punish those who punish cooperators rather than non-cooperators at the initial opportunity to 
punish.  Such pro-social higher-order punishment is documented in experiments by 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) and by Denant-Boemont et al. (2007), the latter grouping it along 
with punishment of non-punishers in what they call “sanction enforcement.”  In what follows, we 
refer to (second-order) punishment of (first-order) non-punishers as punishment enforcement for 
omission (PEO—i.e., for omitting to punish) and to (second-order) punishment of those who 
(first-order) punish cooperators as punishment enforcement for commission (PEC—i.e., for 
committing an unjustified act of punishment). 
We investigate whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment are beneficial 
or harmful to cooperation and efficiency by conducting a series of experiments in which we vary 
the number of opportunities to punish, the information available at each punishment stage, and 
who subjects are permitted to punish when an additional punishment stage is included.  Like the 
papers cited, our starting point is a multi-player, finitely repeated linear voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM, also known as public goods game), modified so that each period includes a 
post-contribution stage in which group members learn one another’s contributions to the public 
good and have the chance to punish one another at some cost.  In a reference treatment 
resembling “first generation” designs (e.g. Fehr and Gӓchter, 2000), group members are not 
                                                          
2
 Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (2012) and Balafoutas et al. (2014) also report that fear of counter-punishment is a 
deterrent to punishment in their field experiments on norm-violation and punishment. We note that their applications 
involve strangers in large urban settings, whereas some of the literature on punishment and cooperation among peers 
has in mind smaller group interactions, for instance irrigation associations, business partnerships, or small 
cooperatives. Our experiment was designed with such smaller group settings in mind. 
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informed of who punished them, and subject identifiers are scrambled each period to avoid 
vendettas.  We conduct such treatments, then conduct additional treatments to study the effect of 
opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment. 
Our additional treatments differ in four dimensions, described in the next section in more 
detail.  These are (a) whether information and higher-order punishment opportunities are “ego-
centric”—restricted to knowing who punished you and punishing them back—or cover the full 
set of potential dyads, allowing, e.g. an individual k to punish, say, j for punishing or failing to 
punish i;  (b) whether group members are identifiable across periods by virtue of having fixed ID 
numbers;  (c) whether there are or are not distinct decision stages in which higher-order 
punishment is the only available action; and (d) whether subjects are provided with explicit 
reminders of one another’s past punishment actions when making punishment decisions. 
To foreshadow results, in all but one of our new treatments, providing details about who 
punished whom how much, along with opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment, 
prove unharmful to achieved levels of cooperation and efficiency.  In one treatment, which 
provides full information, a dedicated higher-order punishment stage, generalized higher-order 
punishment opportunities, and explicit display of information on past behaviors, contributions 
and earnings are significantly higher than in the corresponding reference treatment. The sole 
treatment in which information and additional punishment opportunities prove harmful, in 
contrast, is one in which information and higher-order punishment opportunities are ego-centric, 
there is no carry-over of history, and there is a dedicated counter-punishment stage.  We consider 
broader implications for the efficacy of peer punishment in the face of higher-order-punishment 
opportunities, in our concluding discussion. 
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides additional 
background and details of our experimental design.  Section 3 discusses our experimental results.  
Section 4 summarizes and concludes.        
2. Background and experimental design 
2.1 Literature and design considerations 
6 
 
In first-generation laboratory experiments in which punishment opportunities are added 
to a linear VCM, each period begins with subjects receiving an endowment of experimental 
currency and independently making first-stage decisions on what, if anything, to contribute to a 
group account.  The period then has a second stage in which each subject is shown the first-stage 
contributions of each of the others and decides how much (if any) costly punishment to give.  At 
the end of the period, each subject learns how much punishment she received but not which 
group members in particular punished her how much.  A subject i has earnings in period t given 
by 
 {        ∑    
 
   }    ∑     
 
        ∑     
 
       , (1) 
where E is the per-period endowment common to all subjects, Cit is i’s allocation to the public 
good in period t, β is the effectiveness of punishment, n is the number of group members, r is the 
marginal per-capita return (MPCR) per unit allocated to the public account, and       is the 
number of units of punishment subject j ≠ i gives to subject i in period t. The term in brackets is 
subject i’s earnings from the allocation stage, the second term her loss from being punished, and 
the third term her expense to give punishment to others.  Setting 1/n < r < 1 assures that the 
underlying game is a social dilemma since the social optimum entails Cit = E for all i and t 
whereas maximization of own payoff entails Cit = 0 for all i and t.  In one-shot play or in the last 
period of finitely-repeated play, private payoff-maximizing behavior entails        for all j and 
i, so threats to punish in earlier periods are not credible (by backward induction) if there is 
common knowledge that all group members are rational maximizers of own payoff.  
In finitely repeated laboratory public goods experiments without punishment 
opportunities, the prediction that Cit = 0 fails, with contribution averaging between 40 and 60% 
of endowment in the initial period, then declining more or less monotonically with repetition 
(Zelmer, 2003).  When costly punishment is available, enough subjects pay for punishment that 
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is consistently enough targeted at lower contributors, at least in populations initially studied, that 
contributions decline more slowly than in punishment-free settings, or even rise with repetition.
3
  
In first generation VCM experiments with punishment, subjects are not informed who 
punished them by what amount, and identifiers are switched from period to period to discourage 
vendettas.  Subjects also lack information about others’ punishing practices, which along with 
the identification changes means that punishment enforcement for omitting to punish (PEO) and 
for committing wrongful (perverse) punishment (PEC) are ruled out. Some subjects, however, 
appear to attempt to counter-punish—e.g., a  low contributor punished in period t may punish a 
high contributor in period t + 1 in the belief that that group member is likely to have punished 
her (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008).  One might thus anticipate that providing 
the information on which counter-punishment can be based would lead to more such revenge, 
lowering efficiency. The results obtained in the first treatments permitting counter-punishment 
support this (Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008). 
We designed new treatments of finitely repeated voluntary contribution experiments 
motivated by the concern that the apparent power of peer-to-peer punishment to stabilize 
cooperation in first-generation cooperation and punishment experiments might be misleading 
because they artificially shield subjects from punishment conditioned on punishing, as opposed 
to contributing, behaviors.  More than one new treatment is required because there is room for 
debate exactly how the shielding should be removed.  Our treatment decisions are made clearer 
by considering three sets of issues, as follows. 
History and identifiability.  In ongoing real world interactions, information might be 
recalled and might then influence future punishments any time after an individual becomes 
aware of a punishment event.  Effects are likely to decline as memories recede, so presence or 
absence of reminders may be important.  Informed higher-order punishments are impossible 
beyond the current period in experiments in which identities are scrambled without subsequent 
                                                          
3
 This rising trend is more likely the higher is β (Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008).  Experiments reported in 
Herrmann et al. 2008 suggest that early results, obtained mainly using subjects in western European and U.S. 
universities, do not predict well outcomes in some southeast and east European and Middle Eastern subject pools.    
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display of the required information.
4
  We vary history and identifiability along the spectrum from 
conditions lacking both identifiability of punishers and future display of history to ones in which 
some historical information is presented in future periods or subjects keep fixed identifiers across 
periods, and finally to ones with both fixed identities and subsequent display of information to 
aid memory.    
Information and punishment restrictions.  Some experimental treatments including the 
Counter-punishment treatment of Nikiforakis (2008) and the Revenge Only treatment of Denant-
Boemont et al. (2007) restrict information on punishment and opportunities for higher-order 
punishment in a manner we describe as “ego-centric,” meaning that a subject learns only of those 
punishments directed at herself, and can punish the punishing acts only of her own punishers. 
These designs rule out the enforcement acts by other group members that we’ve called PEO and 
PEC.  A justification for this may be that, especially in larger groups, one may be able to readily 
observe punishments to and from oneself only.  But conditions of observability are situation-
specific, making it reasonable to consider the ego-centric restrictions (only j observes pij) as part 
of a continuum of possibilities.   To one side of it lies the situation of complete non-observability 
of who the punisher is, as in first generation cooperation and punishment experiments.  At the 
opposite end of the continuum lies equal observability of punishment interactions between any 
two group members (i and j, j and k, etc.), a condition studied experimentally in Denant-
Beomont et al.’s Full Information treatment and in Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) and other 
papers on feuding (see below).  Our experimental treatments include ones representing each of 
these three configurations.
5
      
Stages and punishment opportunities.  One way to study higher-order punishment in the 
lab is to give subjects opportunities to engage in it at designated decision stages, as with the 
                                                          
4
 We refer to subsequent information display as distinct from ID maintenance because we include treatments in 
which IDs are scrambled, but subjects are nonetheless presented with selected information about other group 
members’ past behaviors; see the discussions of treatments EGO2 and EGO3Hist, below.  Such information display 
makes it possible to identify past punishments one received from specific individuals, yet leaves other information 
(such as the past contributions of those group members who have not been one’s punisher) opaque.  
5
 While our range of treatments resembles that in Denant-Beomont et al. in this respect, there are differences in 
some other design features and the important difference of outcome that unlike their treatments, several of ours 
suggest that permitting higher-order punishment aids cooperation, with this advantage being statistically significant 
for one treatment. 
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counter-punishment stage introduced in Nikiforakis (2008).   In real world interactions, 
punishment chains reaching up to very high orders may take place.  One way to accommodate 
this in the lab is to allow other activity to stop until subjects have engaged in as many rounds of 
punishment and counter-punishment as they wish to so long as resource constraints are obeyed, 
as in Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) and other studies of feuding.  However, suppose that 
one’s reference point is something like a work group operating under a joint incentive such as 
profit-sharing, in which any peer punishment meted out in the form of snubbing, bad-mouthing, 
etc., takes place as work continues.  Here, the pausing of first stage decisions for multiple rounds 
of punishment may be impracticable.  While an individual might choose to continue an ongoing 
feud with another group member for an extended period of time, the fact that the first-order 
decisions (working or contributing, or not doing so) which occasioned the punishment in the first 
place continue at intervals within that extended time may alter outcomes. One reason is that if 
higher-order punishment follows intervening contribution decisions, observers including the 
punished individual can’t cleanly decompose its causes.  Another is that returning to the group’s 
first-order business before resuming punishment may cool the urge to punish, either because it 
gives the prospective target an opportunity to show reformed behavior, or simply due to fading 
of attention or emotion.    
Because the approach of pausing first-order collective action for multiple punishment 
stages has been explored extensively by others and because situations that it may fail to mirror 
well strike us as common and important, we study higher-order punishment in a repeated play 
dilemma game with the constraint that the number of punishment stages not exceed the number 
of contribution stages by more than a factor of two.  Specifically, we consider two kinds of set-
up: (1) ones in which each period has a dedicated higher-order punishment stage following first-
order punishment, thus a total of three stages (contribution, punishment, punishment of 
punishment), and (2) ones in which each period offers only one punishment stage, so higher-
order punishment is possible but only by taking the punishments of past periods into account 
after the contribution decisions of later periods. With sufficient continuity of identity and 
reminders of past actions, neither approach strikes us as too strongly protecting subjects against 
punishment of higher order, and we think our constraint useful to understanding an important 
10 
 
subset of situations in which individuals may try to cooperate toward some end without benefit 
of external authority.   
2.2 The experiment 
Our experiment begins with a Reference (random ID) treatment of the standard first-
generation cooperation and punishment variety, with a single punishment opportunity and 
scrambling of identifiers to prevent higher-order punishment apart from “blind revenge.”   Along 
with it, we conduct six treatments providing information-based higher-order punishment 
opportunities.  Because identifiers are not scrambled in three of those six treatments (the FULL 
treatments, see below), we add a Reference (fixed ID) treatment that has no higher-order 
punishment opportunities but in which identifiers remain fixed across periods.  The eight 
treatments are summarized in Table 1.  
In each session, sixteen or twenty undergraduate participants are randomly and 
anonymously assigned to groups of four who interact knowingly without change of partners and 
for a total of fifteen periods. As in many symmetric, linear VCM set-ups, each subject gets a new 
endowment to allocate each period and earns one point for each unit he places in his private 
account, while generating 0.4 for himself and for each other group member with each point 
allocated to the public good, a value facilitating comparability with Fehr and Gachter (2000, 
2002), Nikiforakis (2008) and many others among the papers mentioned above.  Thus, subjects 
can earn up to 1.6 times as much if all fully contribute than if they each allocate nothing in the 
group account. To simplify instructions and interpretation, we use a fixed ratio of punishee loss 
to punisher cost (parameter β of Eq. (1) above): a punisher pays one point to reduce the earnings 
of a targeted group member by three points (β = 3). To avoid the possibility that subjects have to 
pay the experimenter for losses, we constrain earnings net of punishment incurred to be non-
negative; but to assure that punishing is always costly and hence a non-payoff-maximizing action 
11 
 
under the traditional assumption of common knowledge of (own) payoff maximizing type, 
subjects always incur the cost of any punishing they themselves chose to impose.
6
  
In the four treatments in which each period has a dedicated higher-order punishment 
stage—our 3 stage treatments—earnings of a subject i in period t are given by:  
   {{           ∑    
 
   }    (∑     
 
        ∑           
)   }  ∑     
 
        
∑          
 ,          (2) 
where       is the amount of punishment i receives from j ≠ i in the first punishment stage, 
       is third stage (2
nd
-order) punishment of i by subjects j ≠ i, Sjt is the set of group members j 
≠ i that are permitted to punish i in the third stage, and     is the set of group members whom i 
can higher-order punish.  The term in large brackets is thus i’s earnings net of punishment 
received, with floor at 0, while the remaining two terms represent i’s expenditures (if any) on 
first and second opportunity (also called 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 stage) punishing.  
In two of the 3 stage treatments, dubbed EGO3 and EGO3hist, Sjt contains only group 
members that i punished in stage 2 and    likewise contains only group members who engaged 
in stage 2 punishment of i, presumably punishing i for her contribution decision. In the others, 
dubbed FULL3 and FULL3hist, Sjt and     include all group members j ≠ i. In EGO treatments, 
subjects’ IDs and screen positions are scrambled each period, whereas in FULL treatments, they 
remain fixed throughout the 15 periods of interaction. Indeed, in all treatments with higher-order 
punishment opportunities including the two-stage  treatments described below, FULL and EGO 
treatments differ from each other on three counts: (i)  whether identities remain fixed (FULL) or 
not (EGO), (ii) whose punishment one is informed of (all, in FULL, that directed at oneself only, 
in EGO), and  (iii) who one can give (and receive)  higher-order punishment to (from)—any  
                                                          
6
 Net losses, in practice rare and limited to a few periods, are covered out of earnings from other periods. The 
constraint that first-stage earnings minus punishment received cannot fall below zero was binding in 23 out of 4,860 
periods of individual subject play in the eight treatments studied.     
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group member in FULL, those who punished one only, in EGO.
7
 The “hist” suffix indicates 
display of averaged past behaviors, and is detailed further, below. 
 A possible concern about having 3 stages in a period is that adding a stage in which a 
subject’s only available action is counter- or (other) higher order-punishing may invite more 
such punishing due to an “experimenter demand effect,” relative salience, or “hot anger.”8 To 
deal with these possibilities, we add two treatments in which periods have only one contribution 
and one punishment stage—2 stage treatments.  Higher order punishment is possible in the 
second and later periods of these treatments since subjects decide on punishment while seeing 
information on both current period contribution and previous periods’ punishments.  But there is 
only one punishment act per period, so its clean decomposition into first- and higher-order 
components is impossible both for subjects and observers. In EGO2, subjects are shown at the 
punishment stage of periods t ≥ 2 each pji(t-1) > 0—the same information available to counterparts 
in the third stage of periods in EGO3 and in Nikiforakis (2008)’s counter-punishment treatment.  
They are also shown their punisher’s period t contribution and reminded of their own, which 
might put the punishment in perspective. In the punishment stage of the same periods in FULL2, 
subjects see a display not only of all bilateral punishments in their group in period t – 1, but also 
the average past punishment between each pair in the group from period 1 to t – 2.9 
Unfortunately, when comparing EGO3 to EGO2 and FULL3 to FULL2, it is difficult to 
distinguish the impact of displaying past period actions, something required for 2 stage 
treatments with counter-punishment, from the effect of having 2 vs. 3 stages.  This concern led 
us to add the “hist” treatments mentioned above. Those treatments are distinguished from EGO3 
and FULL3 by display of history only.  In FULL3hist, subjects see information at the 
                                                          
7
 In principle, the three dimensions could be separated; e.g., subjects could be shown the full patterns of 1st order 
punishments but then permitted to counter-punish their own punishers only in a 3
rd
 stage. Because our experiment is 
already quite complex and this combination of features seemed natural to us as a starting point, we leave it to future 
research to investigate such further unpacking of design dimensions. 
8
 Subjects are free to choose 0 for each ppij, but the concern about experimenter demand is that some may view that 
choice as passive, and that since they came to the lab to be paid for making decisions, they might lean towards 
seemingly more active ones.  See Zizzo (2009). To be sure, the fact that setting ppij > 0 is costly should act as a 
countervailing factor. 
9
 The earlier average information is available from period 3 onwards.  We keep depth of history shallow in EGO2 to 
permit us to isolate any experimenter demand, hot anger, or other effects that might be attributable to differences 
with EGO3. 
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contribution and punishment stages of later periods regarding both all bilateral punishments in 
the previous period (t – 1) and the average of such punishments in periods prior to that (periods 1 
to t – 2).  This display can in principle inform FULL3hist subjects of who punished them and by 
how much in the previous period’s third stage, information unavailable to FULL3 subjects, and 
the display of history in later periods might also make a difference by aiding over-taxed 
memories or raising salience.  In EGO3hist, which has a third stage for punishing based on those 
first-order punishments (of oneself) that are reported to a subject, there is similar display of 
information about punishments in the most recent and average punishments in all earlier periods, 
but with the “ego-centric” property that only those past punishments aimed at oneself are 
displayed.   A schematic depiction of the structure of 2 Stage and 3 Stage periods is provided in 
Fig. 1, while Table 2 provides details about the information available to subjects at the various 
stages of a period, by treatment.  Full experiment instructions, including examples of the 
informational screens viewed by subjects in each treatment, are included in online Appendix C. 
3. Results 
17 experiment sessions were conducted in a computer lab at Brown University between 
October, 2011 and January, 2013.
10
 Table 1 shows numbers of sessions and groups by treatment. 
In all, 324 student subjects participated.
11
 Sessions typically took 75 to 90 minutes from signing 
of consent forms to reading instructions aloud and (simultaneously) from printed copies, 
answering comprehension questions, engaging in the fifteen decision periods, and privately 
receiving cash payment.  The latter averaged $19.58 (1 experimental point = $0.05) plus a $5 
show-up fee.  
Figure 2 displays the trends of average contributions and earnings period by period for 
each treatment, with FULL and Reference (fixed ID) treatments in the left panels and EGO and 
Reference (random ID) treatments in the right panels.  Both Reference treatments display the 
                                                          
10
 We planned 2 sessions for each treatment.  After discovering that subjects in three of the groups in the first 
session of the EGO3hist treatment received some erroneous feedback on their screens due to a programming error, 
we conducted an additional session of that treatment, dropping the data of the compromised groups.    
11
 Subjects were recruited from the general undergraduate population of Brown University, representing majors in 
the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, with 19.6% being economics majors (slightly higher than their share in 
the general student population) and 52.9% female (also slightly above a representative share).  
14 
 
familiar contributions pattern of first-generation contribution and punishment experiments.  The 
average contribution begins around 60% of endowment, and then trends upwards towards 75% 
of endowment before a last-period decline.
12
   
In the left panels of Fig. 2, the three treatments permitting informed higher order 
punishment all begin with and continue to display higher average contributions and earnings than 
their reference counterpart for at least the first seven periods, with average contributions and 
earnings remaining higher than in Reference (fixed ID) for all periods of FULL3hist and FULL2. 
Mann-Whitney tests using group-level observations of average contribution for periods 1 – 15 as 
a whole find contributions and earnings to be statistically significantly different from Reference 
(fixed ID) for the treatment having the highest average contribution curve, FULL3hist (p = .014 
< 0.05, 2-tailed test).
13
  
Corresponding comparisons of the EGO treatments in Fig. 2’s right panels suggests that 
one treatment, EGO2, has somewhat higher contributions and earnings, another, EGO3, 
considerably lower contributions and earnings, and the third, EGO3hist, roughly similar 
contributions and earnings relative to the benchmark treatment, Reference (random ID). Average 
contributions and average earnings for the 15 periods as a whole are statistically significantly 
lower in EGO3 than in EGO2 and Reference (random ID).
14
 The performance difference of 
EGO2 versus Reference (random ID) is not statistically significant, overall.  While comparisons 
of fixed and random ID treatments are potentially problematic, hence otherwise avoided in our 
discussion, we mention for completeness that contributions and earnings are statistically 
significantly lower in EGO3 than in all three FULL treatments. 
                                                          
12
 Insofar as Fehr and Gӓchter (2000) scrambled identifiers to prevent reputation formation and as this was partly 
motivated by a desire to avoid vendettas, it is of interest to check whether there is in fact more punishment of high 
contributors in Reference (fixed ID) than in Reference (random ID). In the event, there are no statistically significant 
differences between the two treatments with respect to total punishing events or punishment, total punishment given 
by lower to higher contributors (perverse punishment), or share of the opportunities in which a lower contributor 
could punish a higher one that were actually utilized. There are also no significant differences in contribution 
amount or earnings. 
13
 Contributions in FULL3hist are also significantly different than those in FULL3 (p = 0.034 < 0.05, 2-tailed test).  
Contributions and earnings overall are not statistically significantly different between other treatments. See 
Appendix Table B.2 for details. 
14
 p = 0.005 and 0.082, respectively, 2-tailed tests for contributions, and p = 0.003, and 0.082, respectively, 2-tailed 
tests of earnings. Earnings are also significantly lower in EGO3 than in EGO3hist: p = 0.048, 2-tailed; see again 
Appendix Table B.2. 
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Result 1: Allowing higher-order punishment significantly raises contributions and earnings in a 
treatment with full information, a dedicated higher-order punishment stage, and display of past 
history, and significantly lowers contributions and earnings in a treatment with ego-centric 
information, a dedicated higher-order punishment stage, and no display of past history. Average 
contributions and earnings are not significantly changed by adding the possibility of higher-
order punishment to that of first-order punishment in our other four treatments. 
To explain the differences in contribution patterns, we looked at differences in the use of 
punishment opportunities, including differences in the extent and targeting of first-order 
punishment and frequency of counter-punishment, punishment of non-punishers (PEO), and 
sanction enforcement for punishing cooperators (PEC).  Looking first at the cost of punishing, 
measured as the sum of costs incurred by punishers and by those targeted for punishment, Table 
3 shows considerable variation among treatments with regard to amounts lost to stage 2 (first-
order) punishing: almost four times as much in Reference (fixed ID) as in FULL3, in which it 
appears that subjects often delayed punishment until stage 3 so as to reduce the likelihood of 
retaliation.
15
 The bottom row of Table 3 shows that comparing total punishment per period, 
adding together both stages in the 3 stage periods, narrows overall differences to a gap of just 
11% in the two treatments just mentioned and to a maximum gap of 1.9:1 between the Reference 
(fixed ID) and the two “hist” treatments.  Impressionistically, availability of higher-order 
punishment opportunities seems to discourage first-order punishing, with the difference made up 
by second-order (stage 3) punishment in FULL3 and EGO3 but less so in their “hist” 
counterparts. While some of the differences in first-order punishing are statistically significant, 
no treatment shows a statistically significant difference from any other with respect to total 
punishment (see Appendix Table B.3).
16
  
                                                          
15
  Escaping retaliation is possible in FULL3 because subjects are not shown who gave what stage 3 punishment in 
that treatment.  While subjects could delay first-order punishing in FULL3, this was not possible in EGO3 because 
there a subject can punish in the third stage only a group member who has punished her in the same period’s second 
stage. 
16
 In the experiment as a whole, 71.9% of subjects punished at least once, 75.0% were punished at least once, and 
the average subject punished at least one other subject in 7.7% of periods, in Stage 2. Regarding share of Stage 2 
punishment opportunities utilized, the difference between the Reference (fixed ID) and FULL3 is significant at the 
5% level, that between FULL2 and FULL3 is significant at the 10% level, and that between EGO2 and EGO3hist is 
16 
 
With total amounts of punishing not dramatically different, understanding what drives 
differences in outcomes by treatment requires a closer look at punishing patterns. The italicized 
rows in the upper portion of Table 3 give information about the pattern of stage 2 (mainly first-
order) punishment, while corresponding rows in the lower portion (under heading (ii)) give 
information about the pattern within that part of stage 3 (mainly second-order) punishment that 
can be classified as counter-punishing because j is punishing i immediately following i punishing 
j.  Overall, 82.6% (by cost) of stage 2 punishment was targeted at low contributors, and the 
proportions of first-order punishment expenditures and events that are in some sense directed at 
cooperators, and more precisely speaking are classifiable as anti-social or perverse,
17
 fail to show 
a clear pattern of differentiation between EGO and FULL treatments.  For example, the two 
shares are somewhat higher in the EGO3 than in the FULL3 treatment, but they are slightly 
higher in FULL3hist than in EGO3hist, and shares of anti-social and perverse punishment events 
(the third and fourth italicized rows) are greater both in FULL3 vs. EGO3 and in FULL3hist vs. 
EGO3hist.   
The rows in part (ii) of Table 3, however, show interesting differences.  Comparing the 
number of points of counter-punishment returned per point of stage 2 punishment in the 3 stage 
treatments, we see that counter-punishment strength was three to fifteen times as great on 
average when a perverse or anti-social punishment was being counter-punished than when a non-
perverse or pro-social punishment was being responded to, in FULL3 and FULL3hist.  By 
contrast, there is a weaker point for point response to anti-social or perverse than to pro-social or 
non-perverse punishment in EGO3 and EGO3hist.  Similar patterns apply in the bottom two 
italicized rows, which show ratios of (a) the proportion of anti-social or perverse punishment 
events counter-punished to (b) the corresponding proportion of pro-social or non-perverse 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
significant at the 5% level.  For total points of punishment given in Stage 2, FULL2 has more than FULL3, 
significant at the 5% level, and Reference (random ID) has more than EGO3, significant at the 5% level.  See 
Appendix Table B.4.  
17
 Following Herrmann et al. (2008) and Cinyabuguma et al. (2006), respectively, a punishment event is classified 
as anti-social when the punishing subject contributed less than the punished one, and as perverse when the punished 
subject contributed more than the average within the group for the period in question. 
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punishment events counter-punished. These relatively stronger responses to anti-social and 
perverse punishment in FULL than in EGO treatments are displayed graphically in Figure 3.
18
 
To better understand the determinants of higher-order punishment, we estimate 
regression equations in which potential proximate causes for punishing appear as explanatory 
variables. We begin with the two-stage treatments, in which second-order punishment is of 
necessity mingled with first-order punishment in a single punishment stage, so our regression 
analysis serves as an approximate way of teasing these components apart. Table 4 shows 
estimates of random effects Tobit regressions in which the observations are specific to each pair 
of subjects in a group.
19
 The dependent variable is punishment received by subject j from subject 
i in period t, and the list of explanatory variables includes both current period factors likely to 
induce first-order punishing and past period factors that might induce second-order punishing.  
As in past studies, the first set of factors include average contribution in the group, absolute 
negative deviation of j’s from i’s contribution (a positive number if Cj < Ci, otherwise 0), and 
positive deviation between the contributions of the pair (a positive number if Cj > Ci, otherwise 
0), all measured for period t (see variables (i) – (iii)) as potential reasons for first-order 
punishment. As the main factors expected to determine second-order punishment, the regressions 
include the amount of punishment j gave i in period t – 1 “pro-socially” (i.e., if Cj,t-1 > Ci,t-1, 
variable (vi)) and the  amount (if any) of “anti-social” punishment of i by j in that period 
(variable (vii)), these being distinguished to allow for differences in response. Since subjects in 
the FULL2 treatment were shown amounts of punishment given last period to group members 
other than themselves, regression [2], for FULL2, also controls for punishment j gave in period t 
– 1 to group members k ≠ i who contributed less than or the same amount as i (variable (viii)) 
and to any k ≠ i who contributed more than i (variable (ix)).  Both regressions include a control 
                                                          
18
 The ratios of gray to black bar lengths for each treatments in this figure reflects the relative frequency of counter-
punishing anti-social vs. pro-social punishers (panel (a)) and the relative frequency of counter-punishing perverse 
vs. normal punishers (panel (b)) in the bottom two italicized rows of Table 3. Unfortunately, non-parametric tests of 
whether the observed differences are statistically significant yield insignificant test statistics because only a few 
observations are fully defined. For details, see the note under Table B.3 of the Appendix.  
19
 We use a Tobit estimator because of the large number of zero values of the dependent variable. We control for 
temporal structure by including a period term, and we take into account the multiple observations of given 
individuals by adopting a random effects estimator. 
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for period.
20
 Finally, the deviations of j’s from i’s contribution in period t – 1 could potentially 
influence i’s decision to punish in t, so lagged deviation terms are added in the regression for 
FULL2, in which subjects have this information.
21
 
The regressions for both treatments support the usual pattern of first-order punishment 
being significantly larger the greater the negative deviation between punisher and punishment 
target, while the positive deviation terms also obtain smaller and less significant positive 
coefficients.  Presence of counter-punishment for last period’s punishing is strongly supported by 
all four estimates of variables (vi) and (vii), with the coefficients for counter-punishing anti-
social punishment acts (variable (vii)) being in all cases larger than those for counter-punishing 
pro-social punishment (variable (vi)), echoing findings in Table 3 and Figure 3.  Punishment 
enforcement variable (viii) obtains a marginally significant negative coefficient, suggesting 
relative approval of pro-social punishment acts by subjects in FULL2.  
For the 3 stage treatments, we use the regressions of Table 5 to study how stage 3 
punishment responds to stage 2 punishment and other factors. In EGO3 and EGO3hist, subjects 
were only able to engage in third-stage punishment of group members who punished them in the 
period’s second stage, so only the relevant subset of observations are included, considerably 
restricting the sample.
22
  In FULL3 and FULL3hist, in contrast, any group member could punish 
any other and all had information about the contributions and about all bi-lateral second stage 
punishments when making their third-stage decision, so our regressions include all i, j pair 
observations for each period. As with Table 4, we use random effects Tobit specifications, and 
the set of explanatory variables is similar except that higher-order punishment is assumed to be 
conditioned on first-order punishment of the present period, and only the deviations between i’s 
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 Period 1 observations are excluded since no previous period punishment had taken place.  
21
 Those EGO2 subjects i who were punished last period by the j in question also know the relevant period t – 1 
deviation, but this applies to slightly under 10% of observations in a given period.  Estimating a version of Table 4’s 
regression [1] that includes only those observations and adds the two lagged deviation terms (i.e., variables (iv) and 
(v)) shows their coefficients to be insignificant. 
22
 To avoid over-complicating the analysis, the analysis assumes selection bias (if any) to be of secondary 
importance.  
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and j’s contributions in that period are included.23  As with Table 4’s regression [2], 
specifications for the FULL treatments allow higher-order punishment to be conditioned also on 
any first-order punishment j gave or failed to give to third parties (PEC and PEO).  
While the table shows only two coefficients to be statistically significant (and one of 
these only marginally so) in the regressions for the EGO treatments, there are many significant 
coefficients in those for the FULL treatments, a difference perhaps in part due to sample size.  
There are indications, first, of additional or delayed punishing of the period’s free riders, in the 
form of positive significant coefficients on the negative deviation term (variable (ii)) and, for 
FULL3hist, a significant negative coefficient on positive deviation.  Turning to genuinely 
second-order motives for punishing, we find significant positive coefficients on both the amount 
of pro-social and the amount of anti-social first-order punishment received by i (variables (iv) 
and (v) respectively). For FULL3hist, the coefficient for counter-punishing pro-social punishers 
is somewhat less than half as large as that for counter-punishing anti-social ones, consistent with 
previous remarks and with the impression conveyed by Figure 3.  The absence of a significant 
coefficient for counter-punishment of anti-social punishers (variable (v)) in the FULL3 
regression, in contrast, suggests a weakness of efficiency-promoting counter-punishing in that 
treatment, somewhat contrary to the impressions given by Table 3 and Figure 3. The clearer 
pattern of differential counter-punishment in the FULL3hist than in the FULL3 treatment is 
consistent with if not an independent cause of the higher contributions and efficiency achieved 
by subjects in FULL3hist.  
The coefficients on sanction enforcement variables (vi) and (vii) are insignificant in 
Table 5, so the regressions provide no evidence of either PEO or PEC.  We also used non-
regression techniques to check the data for more direct signs of these kinds of sanction 
enforcement. In FULL3 and FULL3hist, we found cases in which a first-order (stage 2) non-
punisher received punishment in stage 3, consistent with PEO.  But the large majority of these 
cases can be explained as delayed first-order punishment.  Observable PEC also turns out to be 
                                                          
23
 Whereas second-order punishment in period t of our two-stage treatments must of necessity reference the previous 
period, in the three-stage treatments it can occur in stage 3 with reference to the stage 2 punishments of the same 
period, so actions in period t – 1 are likely to be less salient.  To avoid clutter, we thus decided to omit lagged terms 
in Table 5’s regressions. 
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rare, paralleling the findings reported by Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis and 
Engelmann (2011).  Our data thus suggest to us that rather than widespread use of higher-order 
punishment opportunities for the purposes proposed by Henrich and Boyd (PEO) or for those 
suggested by Cinyabuguma et al. and Denant-Boemont et al. (PEC), the differences in induced 
cooperation and efficiency among our treatments are due mainly to the different patterns of 
counter-punishment by punishment recipients themselves.  Counter-punishment is most 
decidedly aimed at anti-social as opposed to pro-social first-order punishers, according to our 
regression evidence, in FULL3hist, the treatment that attains the highest efficiency of those 
studied.  Correspondingly, counter-punishment is less differentially aimed at anti-social 
punishers (Fig. 3(a)) and least differentially aimed at perverse punishers (Fig. 3(b)) in EGO3, the 
treatment attaining the lowest efficiency.  
Result 2: (a) We find evidence of counter-punishment by both direct and regression methods in 
both the 3-stage and the 2-stage treatments that permit informed higher-order punishment (i.e., 
those other than the Reference treatments). (b) Most of this evidence suggests that first-order 
punishment is more strongly counter-punished when perverse or anti-social in “FULL” 
treatments, where subjects are shown the full pattern of bi-lateral punishments, and is less 
differentially or not differentially counter-punished when perverse or anti-social in “EGO” 
treatments, where subjects are shown punishment given to themselves only, can only counter-
punish their own punishers, and lack IDs that remain fixed across periods.
24
 (c) We find little 
evidence of sanction enforcement, that is, of higher-order punishment by other group members 
predicated on punishments not directed at themselves.  
Subjects possess the requisite information and the opportunity to counter-punish in both 
FULL and EGO treatments, so what accounts for the difference in the relative strengths of pro- 
versus anti-social counter-punishing, and for the other differences in outcome, in these sets of 
treatments? Concern about the possibility of being punished by third parties for inappropriate 
punishing behavior (PEC) may be playing a role despite our failure to detect clear instances of it; 
after all, perceived threats needn’t be carried out in order to have an effect.  Exposure to more 
                                                          
24
 The exception is the regression evidence for treatment FULL3. 
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complete information about the overall pattern of punishing in the group in FULL treatments, 
especially FULL3hist, may also play an important role in its own right. That exposure may help 
subjects to perceive an emerging consensus about who it is appropriate to punish, as well as 
better conveying group members’ opinions about free riding in the contribution stage, which 
could have direct effects of its own on contribution choices. The additional identifiability of 
individual group members might also have interacted with the normative power of the sense of 
consensus, perhaps by inducing a sense of shame in free-riders and perverse punishers (Bowles 
and Gintis, 2005; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009).   
As for our treatment dimensions other than the ego-centric versus full information 
distinction, eliminating a separate stage for higher-order punishment seems to have reduced the 
inefficiency induced by ego-centric counter-punishment opportunities in treatment EGO2 
compared to EGO3, and contributions are also relatively high in FULL2.  The presence of 
information on subjects’ past play seems to raise efficiency in FULL3hist above that in FULL3, 
perhaps in part by reducing the incentive to delay punishment until stage 3, in part by 
strengthening the perception of consensus, and in part by increasing the danger of punishment 
for ‘inappropriate’ behaviors.  Even EGO3hist performs better than EGO3, despite the fact that 
the history being shown has an ego-centric bias in it.
25
 
Finally, to explain the sustaining of contributions and earnings in most of our higher-
order punishment treatments, including their statistically significant enhancement in the 
FULL3hist treatment, versus the lack of increased contributions or efficiency given comparably 
symmetric information and higher-order punishment opportunities in the short and long feuds 
treatments of Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011), it is important to remember that while our 
design potentially allows for feuds of many rounds, those feuds must take place over the course 
of multiple periods, each of which begins with a new set of contribution decisions.  Subject 
preoccupation with retaliatory motives is most likely thereby attenuated, which probably both 
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 We report in the Appendix an attempt to identify the effects of each of the three varying treatment dimensions by 
using ordinary least squares regressions on individual level observations. Having three stages obtains a significant 
negative coefficient, its interaction with FULL an offsetting significant positive coefficient, and displaying history a 
marginally significant positive coefficient. We view the results as suggestive only due to problems with the 
independence of observations; see Table B.12 for details.  
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reduces the duration of any feuding and reduces the concern over possible feuds as a disincentive 
to engaging in first-order punishment.
26
 
4. Conclusions 
We designed experiments to investigate when opportunities to punish others based on 
their first-order punishing decisions are helpful vs. harmful to cooperation.  In a treatment 
closely resembling the Counter-punishment treatment of Nikiforakis (2008) and the Revenge 
Only treatment of Denant-Boemont et al. (2007), we reconfirm that when subjects are shown 
information only about the amount of punishment they themselves receive from identifiable 
others, have a dedicated opportunity to punish back, and when identifiers last one period only, 
the addition of these elements to the original cooperation-and-punishment design has a seriously 
deleterious effect on cooperation and efficiency.  But removal of the dedicated counter-
punishment stage (forcing retaliation to wait until after the next period’s contribution stage), or 
provision of more depth of historical information, even though still ego-centric, prove sufficient 
in our settings to eliminate the negative effect of opportunities to engage in counter-punishment.  
When subjects in our experiment are in addition provided with fixed identifiers and with more 
general higher-order punishment opportunities, including but not limited to counter-punishment, 
efficiency in the presence of higher-order punishment opportunities tends to exceed, though not 
always significantly, that in a treatment with no such opportunities.  The improvement in 
contributions and efficiency is statistically significant when subjects are provided with broad 
information on the history of past decisions and have a second punishment opportunity in each 
period, representing the maximum number of punishment stages before a new round of 
contributions, in our design.   
Analysis of punishment patterns in those treatments permitting it suggests that higher-
order punishment by third parties is rare and is not the cause of the difference in outcomes.  
Rather, counter-punishment itself seems to be more pro-socially or efficiently organized in 
treatments with fuller information and history than in ones with ego-centric information and little 
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 Feuds are in fact much more difficult to identify in our data than in Nikiforakis and Engelmann’s, since punishing 
in later periods could be a response to a large number of potential causes.  This problem of identifiability would 
have affected subjects themselves and would probably have tended to dampen any feuding that took place. 
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history retention. Retaliation against first-order punishers of low contributors is especially low in 
FULL3hist, the treatment that attains highest efficiency.  There, only 7.2% of punishments 
directed at below-average contributors, or 5.6% of pro-social punishments, are followed by 
counter-punishment. We conjecture that the main channel through which treatment differences 
operate is that of changing subjects’ perceptions of what actions are legitimate to punish, and 
perhaps thereby altering their emotional or normative responses to punishment.  Finding ways to 
verify or disconfirm this interpretation would be a useful direction for future research.  
More broadly, our results suggest to us that the shielding of subjects from counter-
punishment in first generation contribution and punishment experiments was not crucial to 
achieving higher and more sustained levels of cooperation than observed when no punishment 
opportunities at all are available.  Although peer-to-peer punishment may in many cases open the 
door to counter-punishments, there is also likely to be some observability of the pattern of 
punishment overall, and (in some subject pools, at least) norms can emerge wherein most group 
members understand that punishment of free-riders is applauded whereas punishment of 
cooperators is frowned upon.  Full information regarding who punished whom combined with 
symmetric opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment and ongoing identifiability of 
individual group members aids the cooperation-enhancing effects of informal sanctions in our 
experiment.  
Of course, small-scale laboratory experiments such as ours should be interpreted with 
great caution, their relevance to real world situations including collective action dilemmas played 
out on much larger scales being at most only suggestive. A more specific caveat is that unlike 
experiments on feuding, subjects in our experiment are not permitted to pause decision-making 
with respect to the (first-stage) collective action problem itself in order to engage in multiple 
retaliation rounds.  Indeed, the applicability of our sanguine findings about the impact of higher-
order punishment versus the more cautionary findings of feuding studies (e.g., Nikiforakis and 
Engelmann, 2011) may depend on whether the problem in question is characterized by ongoing 
collective action demands precluding prolonged strings of punishment and counter-punishment, 
24 
 
or by ease of delaying collective action demands until feuds are played out, an environment that 
in the studies in question can give rise to heavy pre-emptive first punishment strikes. 
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Fig. 1. Temporal structure of each period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) Two Stage Periods (Reference (random ID),  (b) Three Stage Periods (EGO3, EGO3hist, 
 Reference (fixed ID), EGO2, FULL2) FULL3, FULL3hist) 
 
* Note that information available to subjects at punishment stages varies by treatment.  For an overview, see Table 2.  
  
Period t Period t+1 Period t-1 
Stage 1: Contribution Stage 
Stage 2: punishment stage 
(group members simultaneously decide contributions)  
to group account) 
Period t Period t+1 Period t-1 
(group members simultaneously decide  
how much if any costly punishment to  
give one another) 
Stage 1: Contribution Stage 
Stage 3: 2
nd
 punishment stage 
(group members simultaneously decide contributions)  
account) Stage 2: 1
st
 punishment stage 
(group members simultaneously  
decide how much if any costly  
punishment to give one another  
after observing 1st punishment 
          decisions*) 
(group members simultaneously decide how  
much if any costly punishment to give one another) 
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Fig. 2. The trends of average contribution and earnings to the public account 
    
(a) Average Contribution 
 
 
                     (i) Treatments with Full    (ii) Treatments with Ego-centered  
                   Information and Reference       Information and Reference 
 
(b) Average Earnings 
    
 
                        (i) Treatments with Full (ii) Treatments with Ego-centered  
                     Information and Reference Information and Reference 
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Note: All treatments in the left panels have fixed ID, whereas those in the right panels have randomly changing IDs.  
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Table 1. Summary of treatments, contributions and earnings  
Treatment  Information 
Structure
1
 
The number 
of stages in 
each period 
History
2
 Informed 
higher order 
punishment 
opportunities 
Total 
number  
of sessions 
Total  
number of 
groups
3
 
Average 
contributions 
Average 
Earnings 
         
(a) Treatments with Full Information and Reference (fixed ID)
4
      
Reference (fixed ID) N 2 NO NO 2 10 14.0 25.5 
FULL2 F 2 YES YES 2 10 16.7 28.3 
FULL3 F 3 NO YES 2 10 14.9 26.4 
FULL3hist F 3 YES YES 2 9 18.3 29.5 
         
(b) Treatments with Ego-centered Information and Reference (random ID)
4
     
Reference (random ID) N 2 NO NO 2 10 14.5 26.6 
EGO2 E 2 YES YES 2 10 16.5 28.0 
EGO3 E 3 NO YES 2 10 10.3 23.5 
EGO3hist E 3 YES YES 3 12 13.7 26.6 
Experiment as a whole    17 81   
 
 
 Notes: 
1N = no information on who punished whom, E = “Ego-centered information,” F = “Full information”  
2
 YES indicates that history of all past periods’ contributions and punishments are displayed, except in treatment EGO2, where history information is 
available for the most recent period only. In EGO2 and EGO3hist, only history information concerning subjects who have punished the decision-maker 
is displayed. 
3
 Each group has 4 subjects.   
4
 All treatments under (a) have fixed ID while all treatments under (b) have randomly changing IDs. 
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Table 2. Information and Punishment Opportunities Available to Subjects in each Treatment  
 Treatment 
Stage 1: Contribution 
Stage in Period t 
Stage 2: First Punishment Stage in 
Period t 
Stage 3: Second Punishment Stage 
in Period t 
Who Subjects are Permitted 
to Punish in Stage 3 
     
Reference 
(random ID) 
No Information Contribution decisions in period t N.A. N.A. 
EGO2 No Information 
(1) Contribution decisions in period t  
(2) Contribution and punishment 
decisions of those who have 
punished you in period t-1 
N.A. N.A. 
EGO3 No Information Contribution decisions in period t 
Stage 2 punishment decisions of 
group members who have punished 
you in period t 
Those who punished them in 
Stage 2 
EGO3hist No Information 
(1) Contribution decisions in period t  
(2) Contribution and punishment 
decisions in period t-1 and average up 
to period t-2 of each of those who 
have punished you 
(1) Contribution decisions in 
period t  
 (2) Contribution and punishment 
decisions in period t and average up 
to period t-1 of each of those who 
have punished you in period t 
Those who punished them in 
Stage 2 
Reference 
(fixed ID) 
No Information Contribution decisions in period t N.A. N.A. 
FULL2 No Information 
(1) Contribution decisions in period t  
(2) Contribution and punishment 
decisions in period t-1 and average 
up to period t-2 of each group 
member 
N.A. N.A. 
FULL3 No Information Contribution decisions in period t 
Stage 2 punishment decisions of all 
group members in period t 
Every individual in their 
groups 
FULL3hist No Information 
(1) Contribution decisions in period t  
(2) Contribution and punishment 
decisions in period t-1 and average up 
to period t-2 of each group member 
(1) Contribution decisions in 
period t  
(2) Contribution and punishment 
decisions in period t and average up 
to period t-1 of all members 
Every individual in their 
groups 
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Table 3. Cost and distribution of punishment, by stage  
         
 (a) Treatments with FULL Information & Ref. (b) Treatments with EGO-centered Information & Ref. 
 
Reference 
(fixed ID) 
FULL2 FULL3 FULL3hist 
Reference 
(random ID) 
EGO2 EGO3 EGO3hist 
         
         
(i) 2nd stage (1
st
 order) pun. cost (per 
subject, per period) 
2.91 1.72 0.74 1.03 2.09 1.84 2.17 1.34 
         
share anti-social, as % of cost 16.9% 15.8% 12.6% 11.5% 15.0% 20.6% 20.9% 10.3% 
share perverse, as % of cost  17.8% 15.4% 13.5% 12.9% 28.8% 16.6% 15.7% 11.5% 
share anti-social, as % of events 22.3% 19.7% 14.1% 16.5% 22.6% 23.6% 9.8% 8.3% 
share perverse, as % of events 22.3% 21.1% 15.5% 18.8% 32.7% 20.1% 8.4% 10.0% 
         
(ii) 3rd stage (2
nd
 order) pun. cost (per 
subject, per period) 
---- ---- 1.87 0.50 ---- ---- 0.51 0.23 
         
relative strength of counter-punishment to 
anti-social vs. pro-social punishers 
---- ---- 4.16 15.38 ---- ---- 0.63 0.92 
relative strength of counter-punishment to 
perverse vs. normal punishers 
---- ---- 3.08 6.72 ---- ---- 0.54 1.28 
relative frequency of counter-punishing 
anti-social vs. pro-social punishers 
---- ---- 2.44 7.61 ---- ---- 1.84 1.27 
relative frequency of counter-punishing 
perverse vs. normal punishers 
---- ---- 2.18 4.31 ---- ---- 0.99 1.44 
         
Total punishment cost (per subject, per period) 2.91 1.72 2.61 1.53 2.09 1.84 2.68 1.57 
         
 
Notes: Average total cost of punishment per period per subject is calculated as the cost to punisher plus cost to punishment recipient. Punishment of i by 
j is defined as anti-social if Ci ≥ Cj and pro-social if Ci < Cj. Punishment of i by j is defined as perverse if Ci ≥ the group’s average contribution and as 
normal if Ci < the group’s average contribution.  Relative strength of counter-punishment to anti-social vs. pro-social punishers is the ratio of the 
average number of counter-punishment points per point of anti-social punishment to the average number of counter-punishment points per point of pro-
social punishment.  Relative strength of counter-punishment to perverse vs. normal punishers is defined correspondingly.  Relative frequency of 
counter-punishing anti-social vs. pro-social punishers is the ratio of the % of anti-social punishment events that are counter-punished to the % of pro-
social punishment events counter-punished (or the ratio of the lengths of the relevant bars in Fig. 3(a)).  Relative frequency of counter-punishing 
perverse vs. normal punishers is defined correspondingly (and can likewise be interpreted as the ratio of corresponding bar lengths in Fig. 3(b)).       
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Fig. 3.   Percentage of 2
nd
 stage punishment event that are counter-punished in 3
rd
 stage, by category  
 
 
  
 
 
 (a) Pro-social versus Anti-social Punishment
#1
 (b) Non-Perverse versus Perverse Punishment
#2
 
 
Notes: 
#1
 We call a 2
nd
 stage (i.e., 1
st
 order) punishment event “pro-social” if it is directed at one who contributed less than the punisher. We call it “anti-
social” if it is directed at one who contributed more than or equal to the punisher.  
#2 
We call a 2
nd
 stage punishment “non-perverse” (or normal) if it is directed at one who contributed less than the group’s average contribution in the 
period.  We call it “perverse” if it is directed at one who contributed more than or equal to the group’s average contribution. 
The length of each bar indicates the percentage of the relevant 2
nd
 stage punishment events from i to j that are followed by 3
rd
 stage punishment from j to 
i. 
 
  
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0%
EGO3
FULL3
EGO3hist
FULL3hist
Anti-social punishment Pro-social punishment
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%
EGO3
FULL3
EGO3hist
FULL3hist
Perverse punishment Non-perverse punishment
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Table 4. Determinants of higher-order punishment received in EGO2 and FULL2  
(Random Effects Tobit Regression) 
 
Dependent variable: punishment received by subject j from subject i in Stage 2 in Period t 
 
   
Independent Variable EGO2 FULL2 
 [1] [2] 
   
(i) Average contribution in group in period t 
 
-0.028*** 
(0.037) 
-0.083 
(0.068) 
   
(ii) Max {(Cit – Cjt), 0} [abs. neg. deviation in t]  0.27*** 
(0.029) 
0.30*** 
(0.034) 
   
(iii) Max {(Cjt – Cit), 0} [pos. deviation in t] 0.072** 0.084** 
 (0.032) (0.038) 
   
(iv) Max {(Ci(t-1) – Cj(t-1)), 0} [abs. neg. deviation in t - 1] ---- 
0.032 
(0.030) 
   
(v) Max {(Cj(t-1) – Ci(t-1)), 0} [pos. deviation in t - 1] ---- 
-0.029 
(0.048) 
   
(vi) pji(t – 1) if Cj(t-1) > Ci(t-1), else 0 
0.90*** 
(0.20) 
0.71*** 
(0.26) 
   
(vii) pji(t – 1) if Cj(t-1) ≤ Ci(t-1), else 0 
1.14*** 
(0.29) 
1.14** 
(0.47) 
   
   
(viii) ∑pjk(t-1), all k ≠ i such that Ck(t-1) ≤ Ci(t-1)  
---- -0.41* 
(0.25) 
   
(ix) ∑pjk(t-1), all k ≠ i such that Ck(t-1) > Ci(t-1) 
---- 0.043 
(0.33) 
   
(x) t [period] -0.14*** -0.064* 
 (0.029) (0.033) 
Constant -2.73*** -2.89** 
 (0.70) (1.26) 
# of Observations 1680 1680 
Log likelihood -588.9 -511.2 
Wald Chi-squared 134.69 125.73 
Prob > Wald Chi-squared .000 .000 
Chi-squared Test on (vi) = (vii)   
Chi-squared 0.54 0.68 
p-value 0.4643 0.4098 
   
 
Notes: Random effects Tobit Regressions. Our specification as a whole allows Stage 2 punishment in 
period t > 1 to be conditioned on both Stage 1 contribution in t and Stage 2 punishment in t – 1. 
Observations referencing punishment received in period 1 are omitted due to absence of previous period 
information. The number of left- (right-) censored observations is 1528(1) in column [1] and 1549(0) in 
column [2]. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively.  
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Table 5. Determinants of higher-order punishment received in EGO3, EGO3hist, FULL3 
and FULL3hist 
 
   
Dependent variable: punishment received by subject j from subject i in Stage 3 in Period t  
 
     
 EGO3 EGO3hist FULL3 FULL3hist 
           Independent variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
     
     
(i) Average contribution in group  0.15 -0.10* -0.070 -0.45*** 
in period t (0.096) (0.057) (0.064) (0.13) 
     
(ii) Max {(Cit – Cjt), 0}  
[abs. neg. deviation in t] 
-0.038 
(0.26) 
-0.073 
(0.084) 
0.32*** 
(0.048) 
0.13** 
(0.057) 
     
(iii) Max {(Cjt – Cit), 0}  
[pos. deviation in t] 
-0.092 
(0.080) 
-0.16*** 
(0.060) 
0.040 
(0.058) 
-0.24** 
(0.12) 
     
(iv) pjit if Cjt > Cit, else 0 -0.026 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.17) 
1.92*** 
(0.45) 
1.70*** 
(0.60) 
     
(v) pjit if Cjt  Cit, else 0 0.078 
(0.26) 
0.056 
(0.25) 
0.82 
(1.31) 
3.61*** 
(0.87) 
     
(vi) ∑pjkt, all k ≠ i such that Ckt ≤ Cit ---- ---- 
-0.61 
(0.47) 
-0.47 
(0.37) 
     
(vii) ∑pjkt, all k ≠ i such that Ckt > Cit ---- ---- 
0.48 
(0.78) 
-0.91 
(1.09) 
     
     
(viii) Period -0.029 -0.0027 0.058 0.14*** 
 (0.094) (0.066) (0.044) (0.051) 
Constant -2.74* 0.94 -6.95*** -0.0022 
 (1.61) (1.07) (1.30) (2.25) 
     
# of Observations 143 120 1800 1620 
Log likelihood -131.99 -94.78 -623.07 -187.56 
Wald Chi-squared 4.02 10.93 73.61 37.40 
Prob > Chi-squared .6746 .0906 .000 .000 
     
Chi-squared Test on (vi) = (v)     
Chi-squared 0.04 0.39 0.70 4.07 
p-value (2-sided) .8421 0.5311 .4011 .0438** 
     
 
 
Notes: Random effects Tobit Regressions.  In columns (1) and (2), only observations in which subject j 
gave a positive amount of Stage 2 punishment to at least one subject in his or her group are used, since no 
3
rd
 stage punishment opportunities are available otherwise.  The numbers of left-censored(right-censored) 
observations are 107(0) in column (1), 91(0) in column (2), 1662(3) in columns (3), and 1578(0) in column 
(4). 
  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
